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Financing and Investment Flexibility Intrinsic in Revolving Credit Loans  
 
Abstract 
 
 
  Revolving credit loans allow flexibility in the renegotiation of the magnitude, 
the maturity, and the pricing of the loan over time. Thus, revolving credit loans allow 
the borrower to more precisely match the funds required for the firm’s investment 
opportunities and to market-time by borrowing at times when financing costs are 
attractive. Consistent with the renegotiation flexibility provided by revolving credit 
loans, our empirical results show that these loans are positively valued by the market 
both initially and over the longer term. We conclude that revolving credit loans 
provide firms the financial flexibility to better match their financing and investment 
decisions.  
 
 
JEL classification:  G14; G21 
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Financing and Investment Flexibility Intrinsic in Revolving Credit Loans  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Securities issuance impacts the capital structure of the firm. However, equity 
and debt issues are characterized by adverse market reaction in both the short- and 
long-run. In contrast, while financing provided by banks also change capital structure, 
bank loans are generally viewed favorably by the market.  In particular, revolving 
credit loans appear to create the greatest value for the borrowing firm. Revolving 
credit loans allow managers to opportunistically renegotiate the magnitude, the 
maturity, and the pricing of the loans. The option to renegotiate provides flexibility in 
financing and investment decisions as well as in corporate liquidity management. 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) report bank loans are unique because 
borrowers’ experience positive abnormal short-term returns associated with the 
announcement of a loan.  This market reaction is consistent with investors’ believing 
the loan creates value for the borrower.  However, in their subsequent research, 
Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006) report that the market’s initial response is 
systematically wrong as the returns over the three years following the announcement 
are significantly negative.  This suggests that the market is disappointed with the 
performance of the company following the loan, even though they report that the 
borrowers’ operating performance improved after the loan.     
Because Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Gasbarro et al (2004) show that 
the structure of the loan impacts the market’s reaction to the loan announcement, 
revolving credit loans, term loans, and hybrid loans are used to examine short- and 
long-term abnormal returns.  Revolving credit loans have embedded options that 
allow managers to behave opportunistically.  In contrast, term loans’ size, interest rate 
and maturity are negotiated at its origination.  Hybrid loans contain elements of both   4
revolving credit and term loans.  More specifically, revolving credit loans allow more 
flexibility in the renegotiation of magnitude, maturity, and pricing than do term loans, 
and, hence, facilitate market timing by firms.
1  Hence, loan structures that provide the 
most flexibility should be recognized favorably by generating positive long-run 
returns.  Since revolving credit has an embedded option to renegotiate, the increased 
flexibility should be valued by the market.   
 A second issue involves the impact of earnings announcements on firms’ 
market returns pre- and post- security issues.  Prior to security issuance, Denis and 
Sarin (2001) report positive reactions to the earnings announcements.  However, 
Denis and Sarin (2001), Brous, Datar and Kini (2001), and Billett, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (2006) report that subsequent to a security issuance, earnings 
announcements have been viewed unfavorably.  Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 
(2006) also examine the volatility of returns associated with earnings announcements 
subsequent to the acquisition of a bank loan.  Surprisingly, return volatility appears to 
increase, inconsistent with the view that banks’ screening and monitoring reduce 
information asymmetry.  To date, the impact of earnings announcements associated 
with firms acquiring a revolving credit, a term loan or a hybrid loan has not been 
examined.  
We provide evidence that different types of syndicated loans are valued 
differently.  Our results indicate that the market values revolving credit loans, initially 
and over the long run, more highly than term loans and hybrid loans.  These results 
are consistent with the asymmetric information and market timing explanations found 
                                                 
1Although many term loans have adjustable interest rates, their overall flexibility is 
much less than revolving credit loans. 
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in the finance literature.  In addition, the results show that market reaction is more 
positive for the earnings announcements of firms with revolving credit loans 
compared to those carrying term loans or hybrid loans.   
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  Evidence on short- and long-run issuer performance 
A number of studies have examined the short-run share price response to the 
announcements of security issues.  For both equity and debt issues either a negative or 
insignificant share price reaction is observed.  Bank loans, however, appear to be 
unique since they elicit a positive stock price reaction.  This uniqueness has been 
attributed to the banks’ screening and monitoring expertise in mitigating information 
asymmetry.   
Fama (1985) suggests that small firms without access to external debt may 
find the contracting costs of bank loans to be lower than external debt.  Also, he 
suggests that a bank loan signals creditworthiness and that reduces the costs 
associated with other forms of financing.  James (1987), Lummer and McConnell 
(1989), Best and Zhang (1993), Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995), and Gasbarro 
et al. (2004) focus on the short-run share price response to the announcement of bank 
loans.  They report that bank loan announcements favorably impact the borrowers’ 
equity value.  These results are consistent with bank loans being unique.  More 
recently, Fields et al. (2006) report that the positive market response to loan 
announcements has disappeared in recent years although a banking relation may still 
benefit the smaller, high credit risk firms.        6
However, a number of studies have reported a puzzling negative performance 
in the long run following a security issue.
2  Surprisingly, the issuing firms’ stock price 
reacts negatively or insignificantly to equity issues, debt issues and bank loans.  The 
uniqueness of bank loans in the short run appears to evaporate in the long run.  This is 
surprising because banks’ screening and monitoring expertise in mitigating 
information asymmetry should still be present.   
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) examine the performance of firms that issue 
straight and convertible debt.  They find that the pre-issue returns of firms that issued 
both types of debt outperform their benchmark, with the convertible issues being 
statistically significant.  However, the post-issue returns for both types of securities 
underperform the benchmark.   
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) report a negative but insignificant stock price 
reaction to both convertible and straight debt offerings.  Billett, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (2006) examine the impact of bank loans on long-term performance and 
report significantly negative excess stock returns for three years following a loan 
announcement.  Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2008) consider simultaneously the 
investment and financing decision and examine stock price reaction to debt and equity 
issues.  They find evidence that investments funded by internal funds do not generate 
underperformance while debt financing leads to the most pronounced long-run 
underperformance.  However, they acknowledge that the maturity structure impacts 
monitoring incentives and accordingly may influence the firm’s performance 
subsequent to large investments.  Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) contend that 
underperformance following a straight debt issue is puzzling since debt is 
                                                 
2 See Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2006) for a comprehensive summary of stock price 
reactions to security offerings.   7
characterized by low adverse selection, reflecting managers’ optimistic beliefs about a 
firm’s future earning prospects.   
Lummer and McConnell (1989) classify loans based on their structure and 
find that the renegotiation feature of revolving credit loans is positively valued by the 
market.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) contend that banks’ ability to renegotiate 
debt can avoid inefficient liquidation.  Hadlock and James (2002) examine bank loans 
to determine whether they provide financial slack.  Their results suggest that 
asymmetric information motivates undervalued firms to seek bank loans rather than 
enter the public debt or equity markets.   
In addition, revolving credit loans provide the ability to match financing and 
investment decisions, but also to manage corporate liquidity.  Sufi (2007) examines 
the factors associated with corporate liquidity management.  He explains that many 
debt covenants are based on adequate cash flow and reports that bank lines of credit 
are more likely to be used by firms with high cash flow which mitigates the need for a 
liquidity buffer.  Conversely, a liquidity buffer is needed by firms with low expected 
cash flows.  Ostensibly, firms select the most flexible type of debt to cover short-term 
variations in funding needs, and the greater flexibility provided by revolving credit 
loans should be valued more highly.   
 
B.  Earnings Announcements 
Revisions in investors’ expectations concerning future earnings influence the 
pricing of both debt and equity.  Recent studies have examined the relation between 
equity offerings and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements.   
Denis and Sarin (2001) report positive excess returns in the four quarterly earnings 
announcements prior to a seasoned equity offering, but primarily negative (though not   8
generally significant) excess returns for the 20 quarters post-issue.  Brous, Datar and 
Kini (2001) also report negative excess returns associated with earnings 
announcements following seasoned equity offerings, but when they adjust for non-
announcement period returns, they find that the market’s negative reaction is not due 
to the earnings announcement.  Baker and Wurgler (2002) examine the impact of 
earnings announcements on management’s decision to issue new equity.  They 
suggest that if earnings announcements are viewed too favorably by the markets, then 
managers would be encouraged to seek additional equity because they have an 
opportunity to sell shares at a premium.    
The relation between earnings announcements subsequent to a debt issue has 
also been examined.  Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2006) test whether the 
announcement of a bank loan will cause borrowers to become more transparent by 
examining the return volatility associated with the announcements.  They argue that if 
a banking relation results in improved transparency, the volatility of abnormal returns 
should be lower after a firm announces a bank loan because of reduction in 
information asymmetry.  Surprisingly, they report that the volatility of abnormal 
returns around earnings announcement dates is greater subsequent to the acquisition 
of the loan.   
III.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Thomson Financial Publishing’s International Financing Review (IFR) is used 
to identify 5,465 syndicated loan announcements in the U.S. over the 1995–2000 
period.   The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database is screened to 
identify those firms with return data over 1992–2003 to allow the examination of the 
three-year pre- and post-announcement periods.  These constraints reduce the sample   9
to 2,061 loan announcements, comprised of 1,551 revolving credit loans, 387 term 
loans and 123 hybrid loans.
3  In addition, earnings announcement dates are obtained 
from Compustat.   
Standard event study methodology is used to examine borrowers’ immediate 
share price response to the announcement of syndicated loans using three- and five-
day event windows.
4  In addition, market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
used to examine long-term performance.  Specifically, for each loan-announcing firm, 
three-year pre- and post-loan announcement excess returns are examined.  Next, 
excess returns for a five-day event window are associated with quarterly earnings 
announcements from 12-quarters preceding to 12-quarters subsequent to the loan 
announcement.  For all tests, the sample is partitioned into revolving credit loans, 
term loans, and hybrid loans.   
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A.  Performance associated with announcements of syndicated loans 
From Table 1 it is apparent that three years prior to the loan announcement the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of the borrowing firms are statistically 
significantly positive and the results are driven by both the revolving credit and term 
loans.  This suggests the borrowing firms were performing well relative to the market 
and could have engaged in market timing by issuing equity if funds had been needed.  
                                                 
3 The set of loan announcements used in this study are those reported in Gasbarro et 
al. (2004).   
4 Kothari and Warner (2006) confirm that event studies with narrow event windows that are examining 
market reaction with short-horizons are reliable and robust.  A generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity model, GARCH (1,1), is used to accommodate time-varying systematic risk and  
conditional variances.  The parametric t-test and, in order to avoid non-normal distribution problems, 
the non-parametric generalized Z test are used.    10
Subsequently, but still prior to the loan, apart from term loans, the CAARs were 
negative, but insignificant.  However, the need for financing motivated the firms to 
acquire funds in the form of bank loans.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 also reveals that for all holding periods except the year immediately 
following the announcement, CAARs are statistically significantly positive when all 
loans are included.  Positive CAARs are observed for the very short periods of three- 
and five-days
5 around the announcement date and, surprisingly, and in contrast to 
earlier studies, for the very long holding periods of up to three years following the 
announcement.  When the loans are partitioned on type, it is apparent that revolving 
credit loans are driving the overall results.  The market reacts positively in the short 
run and the positive CAARs persist over the following three years.  This is consistent 
with the market recognizing that revolving credit loans are being used effectively to 
increase shareholder wealth.  The initial positive responses suggest that the market 
values the screening and monitoring signals provided by the lender.  In addition, this 
indicates that the financial flexibility provided by the loans is valued.  The fact that 
positive CAARs persist over time suggests the borrowers are creating value by 
investing in positive net present value projects above what the market originally 
anticipated and value creation is facilitated by the flexibility of the loan structure.   
  For term loans, a different story emerges.  The initial reaction of the market is 
indifference.  This is shown by the insignificant negative CAARs for the days around 
the announcement.  However, over the following three years, the CAARs become 
strongly negative, consistent with the inflexibility of term loans and/or poorly 
                                                 
5 The results for the three- and five-day window are slightly different from those 
reported in Gasbarro et al. (2004) because the GARCH (1,1) model is used in the 
present study.     11
performing investment choices.  Hybrid loans exhibit results that vary over time.  A 
positive reaction is observed immediately, followed by no abnormal return for the 
first year, but becoming increasingly positive over the last two years.  We speculate 
that the hybrid nature of the loan allows increased flexibility to match the financing 
with investment needs.   
The nature of the distributions of positive and negative CAARs can be inferred 
from the positive/negative values.  For instance, for revolving credit loans, there are a 
greater number of negative CAARs than positive CAARs in the three- and five-day 
windows.  However, since the mean cumulative abnormal returns are positive for 
these windows, the positive returns must be greater in magnitude than the negative 
returns.  In each of the subsequent three years, the signs reverse and there are more 
positive than negative CAARs; however the mean CAAR is still positive.  A different 
pattern emerges for the term loans.  Here the initial ratios of positive/negative CAARs 
are similar to the revolving credit loans, but the positive CAARs are outweighed by 
negative CAARs resulting in a negative, but insignificant, cumulative abnormal 
return.  Over the longer periods, unlike revolving credit loans, the number of negative 
CAARs for term loans generally outweighs the number of positive CAARs.  Because 
hybrids have characteristics of both revolving credit and term loans, the results are 
mixed.
6 
 
B.  Investors’ reaction to earnings announcements of bank borrowers. 
   The top half of Table 2 reports the impact of earnings announcements on the 
borrower prior to the loan announcement, while the lower half reports the post-
announcement impact.  Substantial differences can be observed in market responses to 
                                                 
6 The results using a value-weighted market index are virtually identical to those 
shown here.   12
the earnings announcements before and after the loan.  Prior to the loan being 
approved, the market views the earnings announcements positively and all are 
statistically significant.  This is consistent with earnings announcements being more 
positive or less negative than the market anticipates.  The positive reaction to the 
announcements implies that the earnings these firms are reporting are viewed 
favorably by the market.  In the pre-announcement stage the market is unable to 
distinguish if and what type of financing each firm will pursue and how the financial 
markets will accommodate their needs.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  Subsequent to the loan announcements, the market recognizes differences 
among the firms and reacts differently depending on the type of loan.  The only 
earnings announcements that are statistically significant for all periods are for firms 
receiving revolving credit loans.  Earnings announcements signal to the market past 
operating and financial performance, but not future investment opportunities.  Firms 
with revolving credit loans have greater flexibility concerning future investment 
opportunities.  Hence, their financial flexibility is better matched to their investment 
opportunity schedules.  If investment opportunities change over time, their financing 
structure expands or contracts to accommodate their needs.  In addition, improving 
financial performance may allow the borrower to renegotiate more favorable terms.  
In contrast, earnings announcements for firms with term loans are not as powerful a 
signal initially because borrowers cannot react as easily to changing circumstances.  
Furthermore, management may believe future performance may deteriorate, reducing 
their creditworthiness.  Thus, they prefer to avoid revolving credit renegotiation.   
However, by the ninth quarter after the loan, the financing decision is relatively old   13
news, and earnings announcements are viewed favorably as in the years before the 
loan.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
  The results provide direct evidence on post-announcement performance of 
bank borrowers with different types of loans.  Insights into the impact of the loan 
structure on the financial slack provided by bank loans are also presented.  First, 
similar to previous studies by James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Best 
and Zhang (1993), Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995), and Gasbarro et al. (2004), 
announcements of bank loans are viewed favorably by the market as evidenced by 
short-term abnormal returns.  However, unlike previous studies by Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) in the context of debt financing, and by Billett, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (2006) in the context of bank financing, we find that overall, borrowing 
firms outperform the market over a three-year period following the loan.
7  When the 
data are partitioned based on the type of loan, we find the results are driven by 
revolving credit loans.  That is, the performance of revolving credit firms is 
significantly greater than the market over the three years following the loan.   
However, the longer-term performance for firms acquiring term loans is not 
significantly different from the market index.  The longer-term results are mixed for 
the firms receiving hybrid loans.  These results support Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
                                                 
7 Kothari and Warner (2006) indicate that numerous studies use matched-firm BHAR and Jensen-alpha 
as benchmarks in the determination of abnormal performances.  However, long-horizon returns can 
depart from non-normality assumptions, exhibit cross-correlation and be characterized by higher event-
induced volatility.  In long-horizon event windows, selecting the appropriate risk adjusted benchmark 
is crucial.  Small errors in risk adjustments can cause a substantial difference in quantifying the 
abnormal return and the selection of the return-generating model is an unresolved issue.    14
(1994) who contend that financial flexibility increases shareholder wealth.  In addition 
we find support for Hadlock and James (2002) who indicate that bank loans reduce 
adverse selection issues and that the market values financial slack.  Our findings 
suggest that the flexibility offered by revolving credit loans to the borrowing firm 
increases their shareholders’ wealth because it allows the matching of financing with 
investment needs and increases financial slack  
Prior to the loan announcement the market’s reactions to the earnings 
announcements suggest the market was unable to differentiate between the borrowing 
firms because they are all strongly significantly positive.  At this time, the market 
does not know when the firms will seek a loan, but the earnings are viewed favorably 
indicating a window of opportunity for the acquisition of funds.  Subsequent to the 
loan announcement the market knows the type of loan that the banks have provided 
and can process the information accordingly.  The earnings announcements attract 
significantly positive reactions for revolving credit loan firms for all three years 
following the loan announcement.  For term loan firms, the responses are insignificant 
for the two years following the loan, but become significantly positive in the third 
year.  Hybrid loans exhibit significantly positive excess returns in the first and third 
years only.  Again, the attractiveness of revolving credit loans is shown by the 
reaction of the market.  These results are inconsistent with those reported by Billett, 
Flannery, and Garfinkel (2006).  However, their study covered the 1980–1989 period 
when interest rates were high and decreasing, while our study covers a period of 
lower and more stable interest rates.  We suggest that the difference in results may be 
due, at least in part, to the very different interest rate environments.  Empirical 
support for this conjecture is provided by Antweiler and Frank (2005) who report that   15
the magnitudes of the share price responses are greater in economic downturns than in 
expansionary periods.   
The type of loan granted by the bank provides a signal to the market 
concerning the nature of the firm.  A revolving credit loan provides greater flexibility 
for the firm to match the sources of funds with the characteristics of its investment 
opportunities.  If managers are optimistic about future creditworthiness, they will 
request a revolving credit loan that will give them the flexibility to renegotiate terms 
such as size, maturity, and borrowing rates, over time.  Conversely, managers with 
less optimistic outlooks will seek a term loan in order to lock in the funding for a 
longer period and defer screening and monitoring associated with a new or revised 
loan.  A revolving credit loan has an embedded option that allows renegotiation not 
only if the borrower’s financial position changes, but also if the interest rate 
environment becomes more attractive. 
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Table 1  Borrower share returns for alternative time intervals  (Equally-weighted) 
Days N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Positive: 
Negative t 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Panel A:  All loans  
(-756,-505) 1693  4.54%  940:753 4.658*** 7.080*** 
(-504,-253) 1817  -1.20% 885:932 -1.131 1.439 
(-252,-1) 1949  -0.86%  970:979 -0.829 2.307* 
(-2,+2) 2061  0.43%  1018:1043  2.815**  1.813* 
(-1,+1) 2061  0.31%  1020:1041  2.603**  1.901* 
(+1,+252)  2047  1.16%  1040:1007  1.076      3.087** 
(+253,+504)  1889  2.07%  1018:871  1.917*      5.650*** 
(+505,+756)  1693  2.89%  936:757  2.677**       6.499*** 
 
Panel B:  Revolving Credit  
(-756,-505) 1298  3.67%  730:568 3.370*** 6.715*** 
(-504,-253) 1384  -1.68% 661:723 -1.385 0.477 
(-252,-1) 1470  -1.57%  719:751 -1.258 1.255 
(-2,+2)  1551  0.51%  771 : 780  2.917**  1.723* 
(-1,+1)  1551  0.31%  758 : 793  2.290*  1.062 
(+1,+252)  1543  3.39%  802 : 741   2.711**  3.502*** 
(+253,+504)  1425  2.98%  774 :  651   2.382**  5.133*** 
(+505,+756)  1293  2.86%  732 : 561   2.291*  6.543*** 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel C:  Term Loan  
(-756,-505) 308  8.90%  166:142  3.744***  2.414*** 
(-504,-253) 335  -2.60%  165:170  -1.167  0.817 
(-252,-1) 367  5.20%  204:163  2.565**  3.304*** 
(-2,+2)  387  0.04%  186 :  201  0.141  0.446 
(-1,+1)  387  0.02%  198 : 189  0.099  1.668* 
(+1,+252)  384              -3.22%  191 : 193  -1.463  1. 102 
(+253,+504)  352  0.65%  185 : 167  0.295  2.115* 
(+505,+756)  309  -1.88% 146 : 163 -0.854  0. 112
 
Panel D:  Hybrid Loan 
(-756,-505) 87  2.06%  44:43  0.393  0.751 
(-504,-253) 98  10.40%  59:39 1.844*  2.899** 
(-252,-1) 112  -11.51%  47:65  -2.275*  -0.905 
(-2,+2)  123  0.56%  61 : 62  0. 801  0. 512 
(-1,+1)  123  1.13%  64 :  59  2. 070*           1.054 
(+1,+252)  120  -13.44%  47 : 73  -2. 686**  -1.782* 
(+253,+504)  112  -4.98%  59 : 53  -0.996  1. 143 
(+505,+756)  91  19.53%  58 : 33    3.902***      3.143*** 
        
The number of trading days relative to the loan announcements is designated by Days. The 
number of loans is indicated by N. The mean cumulative abnormal returns were obtained 
using a GARCH (1,1) market model with equal weighting.  Positive (negative) indicates the 
number of announcements with positive (negative) cumulative abnormal returns.  Levels of 
significance are indicated by t-values and the generalized sign Z. The data include loan 
announcements over the 1995–2000 period. 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test. 
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Table 2 Earnings announcement returns pre- and post-syndicated loan announcements for 
a five-day event window 
Loan 
Type N 
Mean Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
Positive: 
Negative t-value 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
Panel A:  Earnings Announcements (-12,-9) Quarters  
All  3450 0.64%  1827:1623 5.864*** 7.013*** 
RC  2852 0.57%  1500:1352 5.010*** 5.957*** 
TL  428 0.84%  236:192  2.871** 3.345*** 
HY 170  1.24%  91:79  2.475**  1.887* 
Panel B:  Earnings Announcements (-8,-5) Quarters 
All  4372 0.47% 2287:2085 4.688*** 6.847***
RC  3464 0.41% 1801:1663 3.663*** 5.722***
TL 679  0.40%  349:330  1.859*  2.031* 
HY 229  1.54%  137:92  3.570***  4.171*** 
Panel C:  Earnings Announcements (-4,-1) Quarters 
All  4877 0.58%  2591:2286 5.910*** 8.154*** 
RC  3799 0.47%  1995:1804 4.107*** 6.328*** 
TL 805  0.94%  448:357  4.586***  4.861*** 
HY 273  1.06%  148:125  2.375**  2.514** 
Panel D:  Earnings Announcements (1,4) Quarters 
All  4949 0.48%  2596:2353 4.773*** 6.979*** 
RC  3860 0.46%  2005:1855 3.976*** 5.419*** 
TL 807  0.30%  427:380  1.403  3.269*** 
HY  282 1.21%  164:118  2.414** 3.659*** 
Panel E:  Earnings Announcements (5,8) Quarters 
All  4706 0.37%  2469:2237 3.191*** 6.377*** 
RC  3679 0.45%  1947:1732 3.279*** 6.085*** 
TL 769  0.15%  388:381  0.683  1.659* 
HY 258  -0.05% 134:124 -0.091 1.390 
Panel F:  Earnings Announcements (9,12) Quarters 
All  4510 0.43%  2297:2213 3.822*** 3.789*** 
RC 3548  0.30%  1800:1748  2.396**  3.052** 
TL 734  0.66%  376:358  2.842**  1.817* 
HY 228  1.58%  121:107  2.348**  1.553 
This table presents the results associated with quarterly earnings announcements.  Loan 
announcements are: all announcements (All), revolving credit (RC), term loan (TL) and 
hybrid loan (HY). N indicates the number of earnings announcements. The mean 
cumulative abnormal return was obtained using the GARCH (1,1) market model. Earnings 
announcements are indicated by negative (positive) signs for pre- and post-loan 
announcements.  Positive (negative) indicates the number of announcements with positive 
(negative) cumulative abnormal returns.  Levels of significance are indicated by t-values 
and the generalized sign Z. The data include loan announcements over the 1995–2000 
period. 
The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, 
respectively, using a 1-tail test. 
 